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The author directs the Center on the US and Europe on the Brookings Institution
European capitals are contemplating the return of Donald Trump on January 20 with a level of unease. The US president-elect is thought, in any case, to harbour lower than warm-and-fuzzy feelings towards Nato and the EU.
All European capitals? Not quite. Consider Oslo, where senior Norwegian politicians wish to remark reassuringly that “our bilateral relationship with the US will at all times be protected”. They usually do have some excellent points of their favour.
Norway, a founding member of Nato and its eyes and ears within the Arctic, is the guardian of the North Atlantic exit route for the Russian submarine fleet based on the Kola Peninsula. It plans to overshoot Nato’s defence spending goal of two per cent of GDP by 2025, and its long-term defence plan will nearly double the defence budget by 2036; a “civil defence brochure” tells residents how one can top off for emergencies, including war. It’s a serious supporter of Ukraine. Fifty-two per cent of Norway’s $1.8tn sovereign wealth fund is invested in North America. It even has a trade deficit with America. These are all things the president-elect likes.
Ask around in Oslo, though, and concerns quickly surface. Trump’s enthusiasm for tariffs is a specific source of tension, as Norway is just not a member of the EU. “If the US levies tariffs on Europe, and the EU retaliates with countertariffs, we’ll be hit with a double whammy,” sighs one official.
Apprehensions about security are also rife. Russia and China have been muscling into the Arctic. They’re especially keen on the archipelago of Svalbard, which is Norwegian territory, but under a century-old international treaty allows other countries to use resources and conduct research. Were Trump to downgrade the US role in Nato, Oslo would feel far more vulnerable to pressure from Moscow and Beijing. And what if Russia’s president Vladimir Putin, in return for a ceasefire in Ukraine, were to demand US support for tweaks to the European security order — say an expanded Russian and Chinese foothold on Svalbard?
Could all this make the EU appear in a brand new light? Norway said no to joining in two referendums in 1972 and 1994, joining the European Economic Area (EEA) as an alternative. A November poll still has only 34.9 per cent of Norwegians saying their country should join, with a plurality of 46.7 per cent against. Still, that’s down from greater than 70 per cent against in 2016.
Policymakers in Oslo note the EU’s competitiveness struggles and the rise of the far right, in addition to their very own domestic obstacles like fishery or agricultural interests. But they’ve also been watching the speed and determination with which Finland and Sweden have integrated into Nato. One points out that Helsinki is about to get its own Nato land command in 2025, and Stockholm gained a director-general position within the alliance’s international civil service, “while we’ve neither!”
Indeed, Norway’s global commitment to diplomacy, international institutions and law, its military seriousness, its generous development aid, its position as one in all Europe’s key energy suppliers following the near-complete decoupling from Russia, and at last its stupendous wealth fund would all make it a first-rate candidate for expedited membership within the EU.
So the dilemma for an interdependent and exposed Norway is — because the newspaper Aftenposten put it memorably after Trump’s re-election — whether to turn into “the 51st state of the US, like a type of Puerto Rico” or the twenty eighth member state of the EU. The appeal of the latter option is that Norway can be moving in at the highest floor. At a time when each Paris and Berlin are barely capable of lead, it couldn’t just shift the balance of power in Europe, but initiate a restart.
For Norway is just not the one European country that’s quietly weighing its options. Pro-EU parties won Iceland’s November parliamentary election. Switzerland is wrapping up negotiating a treaty package with the EU, and its hallowed neutrality is the topic of a vibrant national discussion. Ireland is just not a Nato member, nevertheless it too has been tightening its ties with the alliance. Sweden’s debate on swapping the weak krona for the euro has remained inconclusive; but war in Europe could make joining the Eurozone appear like additional political insurance.
A sceptical Norwegian banker contends it could take a political “meteorite” to shift his country’s posture on joining the EU. Given the experience of the primary Trump administration, that’s hardly unimaginable. Nevertheless it can be ironic if the forty seventh president were to turn into a fantastic unifier of Europe.
